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V
The Second Amendment: In Defense of Self or State?
By T.J. McCarrick ‘12

The recent assassination attempt on the life of life of Representative Gabrielle Giffords
has once again forced questions concerning gun regulation to the forefront of the American
political conscience. With its 2008 decision in District o f Columbia v. Heller and its 2010
decision in McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court has, for the first time, established the core
protestation of the Second Amendment as individual keeping and bearing of arms for self
defense in the home and that this right is incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. And still, the debate between individual rights advocates and collective rights
advocates continues. Caroline Kennedy and Ellen Alderman effectively describe both sides of
the debate, writing, “Individual-right advocates argue that the Framers intended to protect a
personal right to bear arms when they wrote the Bill o f Rights because such a right was widely
accepted in the eighteenth century ... Gun control proponents respond that the common law right
to keep and bear arms was not an individual right to keep weapons, but primarily existed for the
defense of the state and community.”1With the lack of any clear test to assess the legitimacy of
government regulation which seeks to curtail aspects of the Second Amendment guarantee,
lower courts have been placed in a position of chaos, making ad hoc rulings concerning a host of
gun regulations. As such, this paper will proceed in the form of a Supreme Court majority
opinion ruling on the circumstances provided by a hypothetical, fictional test-case.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MORRIS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF MIAMI
_____________ ON W RIT OF CERTIO R A R I TO THE UNITED STA TES CO U RT OF A PPEA LS FOR TH E ELEVENTH CIRCU IT
April 28, 2 011

Justice McCarrick delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a Miami gun ordinance violates the Second Amendment to the
Constitution. Through analyzing the text, history, and jurisprudence of the Second Amendment
we answer the following questions: (1) What is the core substance of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee? (2) What is the bright line test to determine the constitutionality of legislation
restricting that right? (3) Is this right incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution?

I
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The city of Miami generally prohibits the possession of firearms. A City ordinance
provides that it is a crime for any person to possess a firearm for which they do not hold a valid
registration certificate. The code goes on to forbid the registration of handguns, shotguns, long
guns, rifles, assault weapons, and military-grade weaponry, effectually banning private
possession of any weapons by almost all citizens residing in the City. That very same ordinance
also holds that residents keep any lawfully owned firearms stored in a locked container, bound
by a trigger-lock, or unloaded and disassembled. The final relevant piece of the City’s ordinance
is its restriction on concealed carrying of weapons.
When studying such gun regulations, it is important to bear in mind that Miami is a city
historically plagued by above average crime rates. With a Crime Risk Index of 346, Miami ranks
as the seventh most dangerous city in the United States according to U.S. News and World
Report} Despite recent reductions in Miami’s violent crime rate, that figure still ranks well
above the national average “with 680 [violent crimes] per 100,000 people, compared to the
national figure of 429.”3 Included in this figure are the troubling statistics revealed by the 2003
report of the Miami-Dade County Violent Injury Statistics System. Of the 155 homicides
committed in 2003, 76 percent were committed using a firearm. Of those cases in which the
particular type of firearm was identified (80 percent), 21 percent were committed using a 9mm
semi-automatic handgun, 13 percent involved a .38 caliber revolver, 7 percent involved assault
rifles, and 3 percent involved shotguns.4
Given these statistics, petitioners have been subject to zealous enforcement of the abovedescribed ordinance. Each contends that, in one way or another, the Miami gun ordinance
violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Linda Morris,
an elderly homeowner in her mid-sixties living in a high crime neighborhood, applied for and
was denied a registration certificate for a handgun she wished to keep at home for self-defense
purposes; Steven Patton, a world-renowned crocodile hunter, applied for and was denied
registration certifications for two rifles and two shotguns he wished to keep at home for hunting
and sport; John Prendergast, an off-duty Drug Enforcement Agency officer subjected to
numerous threats by local drug cartels, desires a concealed-carrying permit for his handgun;
Michael McCabe, a videogame enthusiast, sought and was denied a permit for an assault rifle, a
Famas, he wished to keep in his home as homage for the best-selling videogame, Call o f Duty;
finally, Michael Dillon, a member of the National Guard, was denied a registration certificate for
a military-issue bazooka he sought to privately own. The District Court rejected petitioner’s
challenge, noting that the right guaranteed under the Second Amendment is restricted to keeping
and bearing arms when in active service of a militia and that naturally, such a collective right
designed to protect State sovereignty would not be incorporated against the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari.
II
A
In interpreting the text of an organic document, such as the Second Amendment to the
Constitution, our analysis is informed by the principle that the text was written in such a manner
that the words and phrases employed were to be understood by the voters, by “the People”
identified in the Constitution’s preamble. This principle finds support in the advocacy of the
Antifederalists, a group instrumental in securing the existence of a bill of rights to provide
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protection against federal encroachment. The Federal Farmer, in his sixteenth letter concerning a
codification of a bill of rights, writes, “we ought to establish it [a right] generally; - instead of
the clause of forty or fifty words relative to this subject, why not use the language that has
always been used in this country...These [rights] may be secured by general words...5 Thus, any
genuine effort to identify the salient features of a right must be informed, but not shackled, by
the founding generation’s conception of that right. As the legal maxim states: Verba aequivoca,
si per commune usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus praeferendus est.6
Although particular concerns of the founding generation may constitute the impetus for
the codification of a given right, such as the Second Amendment, time and generation-sensitive
concerns cannot be construed to limit the entire scope of the right. Former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his law review article, The Notion o f a Living Constitution, writes, “The framers of
the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations the task of
applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which they would live.. .they
have given latitude to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen.”7 Given this, it is easy to be held
captive by the illusion that the meaning of the Constitution changes and expands with time and
circumstance. Rehnquist, however, is not and to the extent, that is true, it does not suggest that
the understanding of the language employed and understood at the time of the founding is
meaningless. The founding language bears upon, informs, and even limits current constructions
and applications of that language.
Acknowledging the above doesn’t require that idiomatic meanings of certain words and
phrases be excluded from constitutional interpretation. Indeed, idiomatic understanding of
constitutional language is demanded and necessitated in instances where such language was of
common usage and understanding at the time. The question, therefore, revolves around what
exactly the founding generation understood to be the outstanding features of the Second
Amendment.
It is natural, then, to present the words of the Second Amendment which provide: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”8 Structured as such, the amendment is clearly and
naturally divided into two distinct parts: a prefatory clause and an operative clause. What is less
clear is the scope and relation between the two. But to engage in lengthy commentary and
argument here, before any understanding of the relevant words of the Second Amendment has
been demonstrated, would be premature. It would be tantamount to putting the rabbit in the hat
and waiting to declare “Voila!”, as if the outcome were the surprising result of unbiased analysis
instead of a rigging of a preordained result. As such, the Second Amendment will be scrutinized
in the natural order in which it is read —the prefatory clause first, and the operative clause
second.
1.

A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State

In assessing the above prefatory clause, its primary object is clear — Militia.” When we
conceive of the militia today, we are guided by the 1903 Militia Act, which defines membership
to include all able-bodied males between ages 17 and 45, excepting a few very narrow classes of
persons. In short, the militia is currently comprised of those persons eligible for a draft. Indeed,
“militia” meant very much the same thing to persons of the founding generation An early
definition offered by Webster provides, “ t h e m i l i t i a o f a c o u n t r y a r e th e a b l e b o d i e d m e n
organized into companies, regiments and brigades...and require by law to attend military
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exercises on certain days.”9 Because of the great similarity between the above two definitions, it
is possible to locate them under the slightly broader definitional umbrella such that their implicit
assumptions may be made more clear. Black's Law Dictionary defines “militia” as “A body of
citizens armed and trained, esp. by a state, for military service apart from the regular armed
forces.”10 In analyzing the subtle, but crucial, distinctions made here in light of the remaining
words of the prefatory clause, their relevance and function become all the more apparent.
If “militia” is the primary object contemplated by the prefatory clause, it is natural to
proceed with an analysis of the words qualifying that object - “well-regulated.” That adjective
holds no hypertechincal meaning, instead referring to what it plainly suggests - the imposition of
proper training and discipline. This conclusion is supported by countless founding era
documents, and, though a deeper historical analysis will be conducted later, I will employ one
instance here to illustrate the general point. During the debates over the framing and ratification
of the Constitution, the framers thought uniform regulation and discipline as key to the ultimate
success of the militia. James Madison, recounting statements made at the constitutional debates
writes:
MR. MASON moved as an additional power ‘to make laws for the
regulation an discipline of the militia of the several States reserving to the States
the appointment of officers.’ He considered uniformity as necessary in the
regulation of the Militia throughout the Union.
GEN. PINCKNEY mentioned a case during the war in which a
dissimilarity in the militia of different States had produced the most serious
mischiefs. Uniformity was essential.11
The only means to achieve such uniformity of discipline and training was to provide that
the militia be well-regulated, a power granted to national government in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution.
As to what purpose this “well-regulated Militia” is to be directed, we now proceed to the
remainder of the prefatory clause. The framers were quite direct in their identification of the
militia’s necessity; the ultimate end contemplated is “the security of a free State.” This phrase
means nothing more than the overall security of a free polity or nation-state, in short, the
common defense. St. George Tucker, in his View o f the Constitution o f the United States with
Selected Writings (1803), explains:
The.. .want of uniformity of organization, and of discipline, among the
several corps of the militia drawn together from the several states, together with
the uncertainty and variety of the periods of service, for which those corps were
severally embodied, produced a very large portion of those disgraces, which
attended the militia of almost every state, during the revolutionary way.. .By
authorizing the federal government to provide for all these cases, we may
reasonable hope, that they are the most safe, as well as most natural defense of a
free state.12
This quotation is particularly helpful in illustrating the argument that “the security of a
free State” is distinctly security-related and national in character. Through demonstrating the
critical importance offederal discipline and organization of state militias, Tucker shows the
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defense to be provided by those militias as national defense. In other terms, only a federally
“well-regulated Militia” could provide the necessary “security of a free State.”
Historical evidence from the time of the founding confirms the notion that “the security
of a free State” was an 18th century term of art concerned with the common defense of a free
polity, as evidenced by similar variations in wording used in a militia-centric context. In No. 29
of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, a key framer of the Constitution, makes the very
same connection as made by St. Tucker above, in illustrating the dynamic relationship between
proper regulation and national defense. He writes, “If a well-regulated militia be the most natural
defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that
body which is constituted the guardian of national security (italics added).”13 Similarly, James
Madison’s original drafting of the Second Amendment confirms the above notion, stating, “The
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated
militia being the best security of a free country... (italics added).”14
And with good reason. The immediate post-Revolutionary period was one of prolonged
crisis. From Indians to pirates to internal rebellions, the fledgling republic was pitted against a
seemingly endless list of adversaries, both foreign and domestic. Regarding the case of Indians,
especially at the outer reaches of the States’ borders, the union formed under the Articles of
Confederation was ill equipped to respond. Pauline Maier in her encyclopedic work Ratification:
The People Debate the Constitution writes that the United States’ “army had shrunk to some 625
unpaid, poorly equipped men, mostly in Western Pennsylvania - too few to prevent squatters
from moving onto Indian land, which threatened to provoke war at several points along the
western frontier.”15 Such a pathetic, ragtag group was unlikely to provide the security needed to
protect the Confederation’s citizens residing in the west, especially as they increasingly engaged
in skirmishes with Indians over territory. As such, personal possession of firearms was viewed as
critical among the colonists in case of confrontation.
Similarly, it was unlikely that such an uncoordinated group would serve as an effective
deterrent against evermore hostile policies enacted by rival European powers. From British
blockades of American imports to Spain’s closing of the Mississippi to American shippers, the
Confederation Congress was utterly powerless to institute any policy or orchestrate a show of
force to prompt change. Perhaps most troubling was the continued presence of British outposts.
Pauline Maier explains, “In late 1785, the British formally refused to evacuate their posts in the
northwest, arguing that they were not obliged to honor the peace treaty while the Americans
violated it.”16 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the founders sought to project an image of
military capability. As Maier writes, “All governments, including the Confederation, had to
‘maintain the appearance of strength’ even in times of tranquility, and the exercise of military
power was safe ‘under the control and with the restrictions which the new constitution
provides.’”17 In this vein, the militia was viewed as the proper vehicle to strike a balance
between the demands of national security on the one hand, and fears of standing armies on the
other.
A final dagger pointed at the heart o f the young republic was internal instability. In
addition to financial problems caused by currency difficulties and a lack o f clearly defined taxing
powers, the outbreak o f numerous insurrections posed an existential threat to the survival and
workability o f the Confederation government. Whether prompted by unpaid debts to soldiers o f
the Continental Army as in the case o f Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts or by dissatisfaction
with taxation policies as in the case o f the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, substantial
groups o f armed men banded together to oppose government, government w hich was powerless
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to stop them. Pauline Maier writes, “A sense of helplessness made a bad situation almost
unbearable. Congress could only call troops for Massachusetts by pretending they would be used
against Indians: the Articles of Confederation did not give it a clear and indisputable power to
suppress domestic insurrections. The states were equally powerless...The state treasurer couldn’t
even borrow money to supply a volunteer army.”18 It is no wonder, then, that the institution of
the militia was at the forefront of the founder’s minds.
The ultimate conclusion was that individual states, left to their own devices, would be
reluctant to properly address these pressing security matters. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist
No. 25 explained that:
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from
Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore
common.. .The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary
establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a consider time to come, to
bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part.19
It was with these concerns in mind that the federal Congress was granted powers to
regulate the militia, found in Article I, Section 8, a topic which will be considered later.
But before we proceed to the operative clause, there is another, less likely yet critically
important, interpretation of the phrase “being necessary to the security of a free State” meriting
attention. Instead of referring to the defense of a free polity, some suggest the above phrase is
intended to protect the security of the individual sovereignty of the several states. It is true that
the framers of the Constitution had deep-felt concerns over the threat posed to liberty by standing
armies. In the ratification debates, Elbridge Gerry noted, “The clause as it stands [referring to
Article I, Section 8’s provision for an army] implies that there is to be a standing army, which is
unnecessary even for so great an extent of country as this, and dangerous to liberty.”20 However,
supposing that this and other similar quotations are pieces of silver bullet evidence confirming
the existence of a federalism concern on the part of framers for state sovereignty in the context of
the Second Amendment’s preamble is foolish. Such an interpretation reads into the above
statements an explicit concern that simply is not there. The historical record is silent on this
matter, as there exists no known source explicitly connecting concerns over standing armies and
individual state sovereignty.
Proponents of the federalism reading of the Second Amendment counter the preceding
argument by noting the deliberate use of the word “State” in the amendment’s text. It is true that
elsewhere in the Constitution, the term state “State” clearly refers to the individual states. It is
also true, as Justice Scalia explains, that many of these “other instances... are typically
accompanied by modifiers making clear that the reference is to the several States - “each state,”
“several states,” “any state,” “that state,” “particular state,” “one state,” “no state.”21 As such,
when a word in a document such as the Constitution clearly possesses more than one meaning,
context becomes critical. And given the previously discussed historical context and textual
analogues linking militia-related concerns with the national security of a country, a federalism
interpretation of “security of a free State” is fundamentally untenable. This conclusion is borne
out by similar uses of the term “free State” in a non-militia, but rights related context. For
example, in 1797 A Defence o f the Constitutions o f Government o f the United States o f America,
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John Adams writes, “there can be no constitutional liberty, no free state, no right constitution of
a commonwealth, where the people are excluded from the government.”22 That statement is
about qualities critical to ensuring a nondespotic form of government, not a statement concerning
protecting of States’ rights from federal encroachment.
Furthermore, a federalism reading of the Second Amendment makes very little
organizational sense. It would seem rather strange for the framers to have interjected a States’
rights protection in the midst of seven other individual rights protections - free speech, free
press, trial by jury, prohibitions on quartering of soldiers and cruel and unusual punishment, and
the like. This is not to say that there were no serious misgivings over federal control of the
military; there were. James Madison, again in the ratification debates, explained this point,
saying, “As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard against it
by sufficient powers to the Common Government and as the greatest danger to liberty is from
large standing armies, it is best to prevent them, by an effectual provision of a good Militia.”23
However, the body of evidence, historical and otherwise, tends to support the conclusion that the
framers dealt with concerns over control of the militia elsewhere, namely, in Article I, Section 8
and the Tenth Amendment.
For example, in the ratification debates, John Dickinson expressed concern over total
state abdication of control over the militia. James Madison recounts Mr. Dickinson’s opinion as
follows: “We are now come to a most important matter, that of the sword. His [Dickinson’s]
opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up all authority over the Militia.” 4 As
such, compromises were sought. George Mason, for example, attempted to strike a balance
between federal and state authority over the militia. James Madison recounts Mr. Mason as
saying, “Power should be granted the general government to make laws for regulating and
disciplining the militia, not exceeding one tenth part in any one year, reserving the appointment
of officers to the states. A select militia is as much as the general government can
advantageously be charged with. By granting greater authority, insuperable objections will be
created.”25
To that end, authority over the militia was divided in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution which reads that Congress shall have the power to, “provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.”26 It is this clause, not the preamble of the Second Amendment, which ensures divided
authority over the respective state militia. To suggest that it is the preamble of the Second
Amendment that secures divided sovereignty would fundamentally change the substance of the
right. First, it would suggest that militias are reliant upon the Second Amendment for their
existence. This Court is aware of no evidence tending to support the claim that militias are
dependent upon that instrument for their being. Second, instead of being a privilege exercised at
the discretion of the individual, keeping and bearing arms would essentially turn into an
affirmative obligation upon on citizens since a well-regulated militia would be a necessary
precondition to a free State.
Concerns over where to lodge authority over the militia do, however, furnish a final
argument undercutting a federalism misreading of the Second Amendment. The record of the
ratification debates over Article I, Section 8 reveals that the primary concern at the heart of
militia-related matters was that of government disarming its citizens. Elbridge Gerry, a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, noted that, “Less power over the militia should be vested in the
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general government. The states will be only drill-sergeants. The citizens of Massachusetts might
as well be disarmed as to have command taken from the states and given to the general
Legislature. It will be regarded as a system of despotism.”27 This quotation reveals the
fundamental, underlying, and paramount concern of the framers concerning the populace’s
possession and use of arms - widespread disarming of the citizenry. Seen in this light, the
Second Amendment’s primary concern is for an individual exercise of the right to keep and bear
arms, not a collective right to participate in the militia. This notion will be further explored in the
following section.
2.

The right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed

In analyzing the above operative clause of the Second Amendment, we begin with the
possessor of the right - “the people.” The phrase “right of the people” appears two other times in
the Bill of Rights - once in the First Amendment’s petition and assembly clause and once in the
Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause. Similarly, the people’s retention of
unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment is a very close analogue. The salient feature of all
of these instances is the codification of an individual right. Again, the words of the
Antifederalists regarding the necessity of establishing a Bill of Rights are instructive. The
Federal Farmer, again in his sixteenth letter, writes, “perhaps it would be better to enumerate the
particular essential rights the people are entitled to ... these rights are ... established, or enjoyed
but in few countries: they are stipulated rights almost peculiar to British and American laws. In
the execution of those laws, individuals, by long custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c.
have become entitled to them.”28 Clearly, then, it was understood at the time of the framing that
those liberties secured in the Bill of Rights were intended to be held by individuals.
As Justice Scalia explains, “All three of these instances unambiguously refer to
individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through
participation in some corporate body.”29 Though assembly, and to some extent petition appear
more collective in nature, the right to engage in that collective action may only be secured
through the protection of individual rights. As such, any question of protection of collective
rights that may or may not be contemplated by the amendments to the Constitution always
devolves into an affirmation of a guarantee of individual liberty as the avenue through which one
may exercise corporate action. Further case law supports the interpretation of “the people” to
refer to individual rights. The Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez states that:
‘The people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select portions
of the Constitution... [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community30
The implication, therefore, is clear: the people protected in the Second Amendment have
an individual right to keep and bear arms.
However, before turning to an analysis of the substantive right of the operative clause, it
is important to address the alternate interpretation of the words “right of the people,” the
collective rights interpretation. It is argued that like the petition and assembly clause of the First
Amendment, the Second Amendment’s use of “the people” contemplates collective action. This
distinction is bolstered by the absence of the term “the people” as a qualifier for other First
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Amendment rights. In his dissent in District o f Columbia v. Heller, Justice Stevens explains, “In
the First Amendment, no words define the class of individuals entitled to speak, to publish, or to
worship; in that Amendment it is only the right peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances, that is described as a right of “the people.” These rights
contemplate collective action.”31 So too, the argument goes, does the Second Amendment, where
“the people” described in the operative clause reference the “Militia” announced in the prefatory
clause. Therefore, the use of the words “the people” in the operative clause does not expand the
right to keep and bear arms beyond the context of membership in a militia. As the Court held in
United States v. Miller, “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eight inches in length” at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”32
Such an interpretation, however, is simply untenable. First, basic logic would seem to
dictate that any exercise of a collective 8 be conditioned on the preexistence and maintenance of
an individual right. For example, had I no individual right to peaceably assemble, I could never
do so in concert with others. Furthermore, textually speaking, it makes little sense that a textual
provision guaranteeing a right of “the people” would effectually only protect a subset of those
people. Holding that only able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 45 possessed a right to
keep and bear arms, and only insofar as they were actively associated with a militia, is to imply
that many of the very framers of the Amendment, in effect, codified a right they did not
themselves possess. And to suggest that John Dickinson or Benjamin Franklin could believe such
a thing strains credulity. Not a single other amendment, even the guarantees of petition and
assembly, require involvement in some corporate body to be maintained. The entire point of
establishing a right is to make it of stronger stuff such that it might be unconditioned, free to
everyone, of course with reasonable exceptions.
It is now critical to elucidate the substance of the right enshrined in the Second
Amendment - “to keep and bear arms.” As with the prefatory clause, it is fitting to begin any
analysis with contemplation of the primary object of the operative clause - “Arms.” The 18th
century meaning of the word differs very little from contemporary understanding. Justice Scalia
explains that “The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined ‘arms’ as ‘weapons of
offence, or armour of defense’... Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined
‘arms’ as ‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to
cast at or strike another.’”33 From these definitions, it becomes clear that the word “Arms” at the
time of the founding, as today, applied to weapons not exclusively designed for military use.
We proceed, then, to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” The same edition of
Johnson’s dictionary defined “keep” as, “to reain; not to lose...and to have in custody.”34 Again,
the founders’ understanding parallels our own. Merriam-Webster s dictionary defines “keep” as,
“to retain in one’s possession or power.”35 Similarly, Black s Law Dictionary defines the “right
to bear arms” as, “the constitutional right of persons to own firearms.’ Though such a
definition would be more coherent had the word “keep been used in place of “bear”, the point is
clear, namely, substance of the right enshrined in the Second Amendment is believed by many
contemporary Americans to be a protection of an individual right to possess a firearm. Seen as
such, the appropriate reading of “keep Arms” in the context of the Second Amendment is “to
have weapons.” Though there is scant historical evidence containing the employment of the term
“keep Arms,” what examples there are seem to confirm the above reading of the Second
Amendment. The example of Sir William Blackstone is instructive. A key influence on the
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thinking of the founding generation, Blackstone writes in his Commentaries on the Laws o f
England that Catholics convicted of not observing the Mass of the Church of England must,
among other things, “not keep arms in their houses.”37 Similarly, Justice Scalia cites a colonial
law of Virginia clearly providing for the keeping of arms outside of a military context. It read,
“Free Negros, Mulattos or Indians, and Owners of Slaves, seated at Frontier Plantations, may
obtain License from a Justice of Peace, for keeping Arms, &c.”38 This evidence does not negate
the body of evidence in which “keep Arms” was employed in a militia-related context. It simply
and convincingly suggests that the right was conceived and understood as a general protection
for everyone not solely militiamen.
This interpretation of the Second Amendment is confirmed by the both modem and 18th
century understandings of the term “bear Arms.” In Muscarello v. United States, Justice
Ginsburg writes that, “surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second
Amendment.. .indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry.. .upon the person or in the clothing or in a
pocket, for the purpose.. .of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of
conflict with another person.’”39 Such an interpretation captures the natural meaning of the
phrase “bear Arms” as carrying a weapon for the purpose of confrontation. Again, founding era
dictionaries including Johnson and Webster define “bear” as meaning “to carry.”40 As such, it is
clear that the words “bear Arms” did not have an exclusive military connotation. For example,
four years before the first draft of the Bill of Rights was presented, the framers employed the
phrase “bear arms” in an explicit nonmilitary context. James Madison submitted a Bill for the
Preservation of Deer, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, before the Virginia General Assembly which
read, “And, if, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he shall bear a gun out of
his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty, it shall be deemed a breach of the
recognizance, and be good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing a gun shall be a
breach of the new recognizance and cause to bind him again.(italics added)”41 Here, the phrase
“bear a gun” can be understood in no other context than a nonmilitary one, as the act clearly
exempts military related carrying of weapons from the general prohibition. Clearly then,
Madison, and many if not all of the framers, would have possessed an understanding of the
phrase “bear arms” that was not uniquely militant in nature and could easily encompass uses of
weapons for hunting and self defense.
Despite this fact, there is some evidence to support the notion that “bear Arms” bore a
military-specific connotation. Justice Stevens, quoting the Oxford English Dictionary in his
dissent in District o f Columbia v. Heller, writes, “The term ‘bear arms’ is a familiar idiom; when
used unadorned by additional words, its meaning is ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service,
fight.”42 One pre-ratification example of this interpretation is found in the Declaration of
Independence. Objecting to the tyrannical policies of King George, it reads, “He has constrained
our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their country.”43
Another such example is found in the words of the Providence Gazette of 1775 which state, “By
the common estimate of three millions of people in America, allowing one in five to bear arms,
there will be found 600,000 fighting men.”44 Given this evidence, it is not wholly unreasonable
to suggest that the phrase “bear Arms,” unadorned by any identification of protected nonmilitary
purposes, naturally refers to a military-related right.
Very similarly, there exists evidence that the word “keep,” as used in the Amendment,
also connotes a military meaning. Again Justice Stevens in his dissent points to a number of
militia laws enacted around the time of the founding which use the term “keep” in a particular
military context. He offers the example of a Virginia military law which held that, “every one of
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the said officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates shall constantly keep the aforesaid
arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced whenever called for by his
commanding officer.”45 Such an interpretation very clearly contextualizes and embodies the
identified militia-related concern of the preamble and protects the unitary ability to possess and
use arms in connection with such a militia. As Justice Stevens puts it, “the single right that [the
Second Amendment] does describe is both a duty and a right to have arms available and ready
for military service and of use them for military purposes when necessary.”46
Unfortunately the military-centric interpretation of the Second Amendment fails
to grasp the fundamental point. The right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not to secure
the right to participate in a militia. And to continuously point to the repeated militia-related
contexts surrounding the Amendment is no answer. It is both unsurprising and unremarkable that
the terms “keep arms” and “bear arms” were most often used in a military context. Founding era
sources would have few other occasions to employ such terms outside concerns of national
security and standing armies. So, to assign Second Amendment language an exclusive meaning
borders on ridiculous. Justice Scalia explains “This is rather like saying that, since there are
many statutes that authorize aggrieved employees to ‘file complaints’ with federal agencies, the
phrase ‘file complaints’ has an employment-related connotation.”47 Such a reading is especially
ridiculous given the previously proffered examples of founders using the phrases “keep arms”
and “bear arms” is evidently non-military contexts. This fact is underscored by the absence of
any dictionary definition qualifying the possession or use of arms as exclusively related to
service in a militia.
Proponents of a collective -right interpretation counter the above argument by pointing to
James Madison’s early drafts of the Second Amendment, and particularly, the inclusion of a
conscientious-objector clause. The proposal of Madison’s Virginia’s Ratifying Convention read,
“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and wellregulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.”48 From this and other
similar conscientious-objector clauses, Justice Stevens concludes that the Amendment possesses
a distinctly military context as compulsory militia service would be the sole situation in which
such a provision could be invoked. As such, because Madison and the framers did not insist on
the inclusion of language explicitly protecting nonmilitary uses of arms, “bear Arms” means the
very same thing in the substantive portion of the Amendment (IE-the protection from
infringement) as it does in the conscientious-objector portion.
Such an analysis is faulty, however, and cripples collective-rights advocates’ arguments
in contradiction. First, it is always dubious to draw conclusions concerning the meaning of an
amendment from proposals rejected during the drafting process. It is rather bizarre to derive what
Justice Stevens calls “the central meaning” of the Second Amendment from a provision not even
included in the final product. Similarly, any conclusion based on an omitted proposal is
guesswork at best, as there is no possible way to know with any degree of certainty what
Madison meant by the initial inclusion and eventual exclusion of the conscientious-objector
clause. Allow me to concede for a moment what Justice Stevens would have us believe, namely,
that Madison included protections for religiously scrupulous persons against compulsory military
service to contextualize the military-related nature of the right. Wouldn' t the logical consequence
of accepting that argument, given Madison’s subsequent elimination of that provision, yield the
very opposite reading of the Amendment that Justice Stevens intends? Given Madison’s
previously referenced uses of the term “bear Arms” in civilian contexts, it would be entirely
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reasonable to speculate that the elimination of the conscientious-objector clause was intended to
broaden the protection of the Amendment to civilian uses. But, this conclusion, like Justice
Stevens’, is conjecture at best.
Second, this piece of historical evidence clearly confirms the previously disputed position
that “security of a free State” refers to a national polity. A federalism reading of the Second
Amendment makes logical sense only if “security of a free State” refers to the protection of the
individual sovereignty and political autonomy of the respective states of the Union. The above
proposal by James Madison represents a clear denial of that reading. The deliberate attempt by
proponents of a federalism reading of the Second Amendment to ignore the deliberate use of the
word “country” and its analogue “State,” which remain in the Amendment, while highlighting
and privileging its excluded conscientious-objector provisions represents hypocrisy and political
opportunism of the worst kind. It demonstrates the commitment of collective-rights not to
fidelity to the Constitution, but to their previously held conceptions of appropriate gun policy in
America.
Finally, Justice Stevens’ analysis of initial drafts of the Second Amendment ignores
elementary grammatical construction. Like many other amendments, it is quite possible and
indeed likely that initial drafts of the Amendment sought to protect multiple related rights.
Justice Scalia cites the example of the First Amendment, writing, “[it] protects the ‘right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition Government for a redress of grievances.”49 These
are found in the very same Amendment which protects freedom of the press and religion. So too,
early drafts of the Second Amendment sought to protect related but distinct freedoms, an
argument which also effectively counters any assertion that the Second Amendment guarantees a
unitary right. The use of semicolons in Madison’s initial draft is telling. Separating related, but
distinct guarantees, they demonstrate that though connected, the Amendment was directed
towards multiple ends. Such a view is confirmed by the precursor to Madison’s initial draft, the
proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying Convention. They read:
17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated Militia composed of the body of people trained to arms is the proper,
natural and safe defence of a free State. That standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and
protections of the Community will admit and that in all cases the military should
be under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power...
19th, That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be
exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his
stead.50
Here, the Second Amendment analogue and conscientious-objector protection are split
between two different guarantees. Though both employ the phrase “bear arms,” the use of this
term in the 17th proposal is substantively different than that in the 19th. While the latter expressly
possesses a military context, and indeed could only be invoked in a military context, the former
stands alone. Unadorned with specific purpose and set off from militia-related clauses by a
semicolon, it would be imprudent to arbitrarily assume an exclusively military context to the
right.
The final piece of the operative clause maintains that the guaranteed right to keep and
bear arms “shall not be infringed.” This language is instructive in that the right protected, like the
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First and Fourth Amendments, is a preexisting right. As the Court explained in United States v.
Cruikshank, “The right there specified is that o f 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is not a
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for
its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed...”51 Thus, the
Second Amendment is really just a formal recognition of the right’s common law legacy in the
Anglo-American tradition of rights and jurisprudence. As such, that history, as we will soon see
is instructive.
3.

Relationship between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause

To adequately identify the substance of the right protected by the Second Amendment,
we must identify the proper relation between the prefatory clause and the operative clause.
Reason requires that there be an identifiable connection between the purpose announced in the
preamble of the Amendment and its substantive guarantee and effect as illustrated in the
operative provision. Absent such a relationship, the Amendment would be incongruous. Justice
Scalia illustrates, “The Second Amendment would be nonsensical if it read: ‘A well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to petition for
redress of grievances shall not be infringed.”’52 Therefore, it is wholly unsurprising that an
important connection exists between the prefatory and operative clauses. The question, however,
is what is the proper relation between the two. Does the former contextualize and fundamentally
limit the latter? Or, does the former announce a nonexclusive purpose or reason for codifying the
latter?
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the prefatory clause qualifies and defines
the scope of the right guaranteed in the operative clause. Such an interpretive model is justified
by precepts enshrined in the common law legacy of Sir Edward Coke. Two of his maxims for
statutorial interpretation hold: Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae specialiter sunt
comprehensa53 and Verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita adpriora quae certitudine
indigent sunt referenda.54 As such, the general grants or rights are contextualized, limited, and
defined by surrounding clarifying language. Justice Stevens further explains this point through
the use of Sir William Blackstone, writing:
the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is
by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs the most
natural and probable... if words happen to still be dubious, we may establish their
meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to compare a
word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus,
the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of
parliament.55
Thus, only by privileging the words of the prefatory clause can the Court truly stand with
Chief Justice John Marshall in saying, “it cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution
is intended to be without effect.” 56
Under such a view, the Second Amendment only protects the keeping and bearing
of arms in connection with service in a militia. As the Court held in United States v. Miller.
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use
of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the light
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to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could
contribute to the common defense.57
Hence, only those belonging to the militia in possession of weaponry commonly
employed by contemporary militia are protected under the Second Amendment. In this fashion,
bans on the ownership or possession of handguns, shotguns, and many semi-automatic weapons
would be entirely permissible.
And yet this interpretation remains problematic. First, it seems strange for collectiverights advocates to cling to interpretive models which privilege a prefatory clause while
simultaneously suggesting that the meaning of the operative clause is clear. Remember above,
that Justice Stevens and many others submit that the phrase “keep and bear Arms” possesses a
distinctly military context unless explicitly referring to nonmilitary activity. Perhaps, then, the
privileged-preamble mode of interpretation betrays an understanding on the part of such
proponents that the meaning of the operative clause is clear indeed in its protection of
nonmilitary uses. Applying the prefatory clause restrictively is simply another means to achieve
the preordained goal of justifying severe gun regulation.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a federalism reading of the Second Amendment
would have serious implications in terms of what exactly the right is, and who would possess it.
Certainly a ban on handguns and other sorts of small arms will stand under a federalism reading
of the Second Amendment. However, other gun regulations, particularly restrictions on
automatic and semiautomatic weapons will crumble. Technological innovation has made the
tools of war all the more deadly. Instead of muskets, we have machine guns; instead of bayonets,
we have bazookas. In colonial times, weapons of war and self-defense were one in the same.
Today, they are wholly separate and pose unique risks. As Justice Breyer argues, “at least six
States and Puerto Rico impose general bans on certain types of weapons, in particular assault
weapons or semiautomatic weapons...These bans suggest...there may be no substitute to an
outright prohibition in cases where a governmental body has deemed a particular type of weapon
especially dangerous.”58 Ironically, then, what is guaranteed by collective-rights reading of the
Second Amendment is the very opposite of what gun regulation proponents seek - private
possession of highly dangerous weapons.
Equally troublesome is who would possess the right. As previously mentioned, all able
bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 must register for the Selective Service and are
statutorily considered members of the Reserve Militia. Therefore, continuing to apply the Court’s
holding in Miller is to guarantee only all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 45 the
right to personally own and stow M-16s and other weapons of warfare. As such, some of the
most vulnerable members of society - women and the elderly - will be denied any such
protection. Unlike virtually every other right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, this
right will not be held by all people, but by a particular subgroup. Such an extreme, dangerous,
and restrictive reading of the Second Amendment simply cannot stand.
Instead, we should be guided by traditional principles of statutory and
constitutional interpretation which recognize the fundamental and inherent limitations upon the
significance of prefatory clauses. Jabez Sutherland, in his renowned treatise on statutory
construction explains, “The preamble in a statute is a prefatory statement or explanation...It is
not part of the law, in a legislative sense, and hence... cannot of itself confer any power.”59
Sutherland continues, noting that that there is, of course, an important relationship between a
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prefatory clause and operative clause, in that the former often identifies a critical concern to be
addressed by the latter. However, that does not give judges license to restrict the actual substance
of the enactment. He explains:
A clear and explicit enactment is not cut down by a more limited preamble
or recital, even though the enacting clause is in general words and the preamble
particular. Strong words in the enacting part of a statute may extend beyond it
beyond the preamble.. .Sometimes the legislature, having a particular mischief in
view, to prevent which was the first and immediate object of the statute, recites
that in the preamble, and then goes on in the body of the act to provide a remedy
for general mischiefs of the same nature but of different species, not expressed in
the preamble nor perhaps then in contemplation.60
The legislative reference is of particular help here. In construing a congressional statute,
the “Whereas” clauses are really just a series of prefatory clauses. Though useful in identifying
the envisioned harmed to be addressed by the resolution, such statements are not law and do not
restrict the scope of the actual policy action. Seen in this way, the Second Amendment could
easily be envisioned as reading, “Whereas a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” or “Because a
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Any other mode of interpreting the Second Amendment
would require the resolution of constitutional questions turn on matter of purpose rather than
effect. And though the Amendment clearly identifies a profound concern of the framers, it, like
the other concerns which acted as catalysts for other constitutional protections, ebbs, flows, and
evolves with time.
The prefatory clause to the Second Amendment embodies a concern, a purpose, but not a
sole concern or sole focus. This Court’s interest lies in finding, elucidating, and safeguarding the
core of the right at issue, an interest shared by the founders. Again, The Federal Farmer explains
that regarding the codification of rights:
these same rights, being established by the state constitutions, and secured
to the people, our recognizing them now, implies, that the people thought them
insecure by state establishments, and extinguished or put afloat by the new
arrangement of the social system unless reestablished... the little different
appendages and modifications tacked to it in the different states, are no more than
a drop in the ocean.. .it is the substance we would save, not the little articles of
form.61
Applying this mode of analysis to the Second Amendment, the protection guaranteed in
the operative clause is clearly located as the core of the right, unrestricted by the addition of any
preamble.

B
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We now turn to the substantive guarantee of the Second Amendment. As previously
demonstrated, numerous founding-era documents reveal the intent of the framers to incorporate
civilian uses of firearms under the umbrella of the Amendment. However, these statutory
distinctions are of a fundamental different nature than a constitutional guarantee. It is instructive,
therefore, to study guarantees made in various state constitutions. While it may be true that, in a
number of areas, state constitutions lacked the same scope of protection as federal guarantees, it
seems highly unlikely in the case of the Second Amendment, where there is considerable
similarity between the federal protection and various state guarantees. Indeed, the advocacy of
the Antifederalists seems to confirm this hypothesis. The Federal Farmer writes:
There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed ... These rights
should be made the basis of every constitutions ... I never thought the people of
these states differed essentially in these respects; they having derived all these
rights from one common source, the British systems; and having in the formation
of their state constitutions discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are
very similar.62
Thus, united in the British common law heritage, the various state arms-bearing
protections are of identical nature to the federal guarantee.
Between the period of independence and the early 19th century, nine states chose to adopt
arms-bearing protections which explicitly refer to nonmilitary use of weapons. Of the four
choosing to adopt Second Amendment analogues immediately following independence, it
important to note that two of them - Pennsylvania and Vermont - explicitly protected the natural
law of self preservation for individuals. Pennsylvania’s Constitution, adopted in 1776 read, “That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”63 Vermont’s,
adopted in 1786 identically holds, “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of
themselves and the State.”64 Similarly, New Hampshire, though not explicitly protecting a
natural right of self defense, clearly sought to protect an individual’s right to bear arms
unconnected with service in a militia by recommending the following change to the Constitution:
“Congress shall never disarm any citizen unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion.”65
Similar proposals were offered by Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania
minority proposal, the latter which read, “That the people have a right to bear arms for the
defence of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game; no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals...”66 Finally, between the ratification
of the Constitution and 1820, nine states chose to adopt Second Amendment analogues. Of these,
“Four of them - Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri - referred to the right of the people to
‘bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.’ Another three States - Mississippi,
Connecticut, and Alabama - used the even more individualistic phrasing that each citizen has the
‘right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.’”67 Taken together with the position of
the Anti federalists that there was little substantive difference between analogous state and federal
protections, the above examples confirm the historical record that the Second Amendment
protected civilian uses of arms, particularly and centrally, a natural right of self defense.
Further evidence locating a natural law of self defense at the heart of arms-bearing
guarantees is seen in America’s inheritance of Britain’s common law legacy. Remarking on the
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origins of many of the rights to be secured, the Federal Farmer notes, “These rights are not
necessarily reserved, they are established, or enjoyed but in a few countries: they are stipulated
rights almost peculiar to British and American laws. In the execution of those laws, individuals,
by long custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c. have become entitled to them.”68 One such
right is that to bear arms for self defense. Justice James Wilson, a founder of considerable
influence, writes, “Homicide is enjoined, when it is necessary for the defence of one’s person or
house. With regard to the first, it is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have
seen, cannot be repealed, superseded, or suspended by any human institution. This law, however,
is expressly recognised in the constitution of Pennsylvania.. .This is one of our many renewals of
the Saxon regulations.”69 Therefore, any comprehensive understanding of the Second
Amendment right or its various state analogues must be informed by an analysis of its British
origins.
One key source of the British tradition is found in the all encompassing work of Sir
William Blackstone, particularly his Commentaries on the Laws o f England. Blackstone, a
profound legal scholar and expositor of common law rights retained by British subjects was well
known to and incredibly influential upon the framers. And it is with this profound familiarity and
affection for a uniquely British conception of certain rights in view that the substance of the
Second Amendment must be understood. Regarding citizens ownership and use of arms,
Blackstone held, “In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the
liberties of Englishmen... we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment
of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property.. .To vindicate these rights.. .the
subjects of England are entitled...to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and
defence.”70 To be clear, lest a keen-eyed collectivist hijack the above language to fit their needs,
Blackstone locates the right as an individual one, writing, “The defence of one’s self, or the
mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, master and servant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these relations be forcibly
attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force, (italics added)”71
Thusly, as in England, where the natural right of self-preservation was understood as central to
the Lockean pursuit of security, liberty, and property, the Second Amendment’s guarantee ought
be envisioned to encompass the very same substance, such that it may be located as central to the
Jeffersonian pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Though not contained textually
in the Constitution, it can hardly be contested that the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are bedrock principles of our nation, principles the Constitution is directed towards
preserving.
The historical events in England leading up to the formal recognition of a right to bear
arms are found in the period between the Restoration and 1688 Revolution in which many of the
Stuart monarchs sought to disarm political opponents through the use of private militia forces.
As a result, English subjects became wary of attempts to disarm the jealous population as the
first in a series of steps to establish a monopoly of force in the hands of the Crown which,
inevitably, would be turned upon the population. Therefore, with William and Mary’s victory in
the Glorious Revolution came a guarantee in the English Bill of Rights, hold, “that the subjects
which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed
by law.”72 Though restricted to Protestants, the lesson is clear -Englishmen considered the
individual possession and use of arms as a fundamental liberty unconnected with service in any
organized military force. Indeed, even after the establishment of that arms-bearing guarantee,
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attempts were made to restrict individual arms-bearing protections. St. George Tucker comments
that:
In England, the people have disarmed, generally, under the specious
pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed
aristocracy to support any measure, under the mask, though calculated for very
different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract
this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words
suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorize the
prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any
farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that
not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to
a penalty.73
Unlike its predecessor, the Second Amendment’s substantive guarantee and operative
clause are unrestricted, avoiding such limiting attempts as those described by St. George Tucker
and advocated by collectivists.
Unsurprisingly, the colonists endured many of the same experiences under the reign of
George III. In the decades leading up to the revolution, the Crown sought to disarm colonists
residing in the most rebellious areas, provoking invocations of the English Bill of Rights the
common law legacy growing out of it. Justice Scalia, quoting a 1769 New York publication
explains, “it is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the
Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.”74 This interpretation was not abandoned as
the revolution culminated in independence. Such an individualist understanding of the armsbearing right was adopted by Thomas Jefferson proposing the following amendment in his draft
constitution for the state of Virginia. It reads, “No freeman shall be debarred the use of arms
within his own lands.”75 Though not adopted, this provision not only offers insight as to the
individual nature of the Second Amendment right, but also into the obvious fact that this right, as
all others, is not unlimited.
Therefore, the holding of the Court in United States v. Miller - that only weapons
suitable for militia use are protected by the Second Amendment - is hereby overruled. That case
was unable, and indeed, did not seek to undertake a thorough examination of the scope of the
Second Amendment. The respondent in that case made no appearance; the Government relied
solely on obscure English legal sources; and no one, including the Court, explored or even
mentioned the text or history of the Second Amendment.76 As such, and given the body of
evidence provided above, confining citizens’ arms-bearing right to be solely connected with
participation in a militia is unsupported by text, history, and traditional canons of statutory
interpretation. Instead, it is clear that the Amendment protects, at its core, the right of an
individual to personally own and use a firearm in the furtherance of one’s natural right of self
preservation.
This right, like many other liberties, is at its zenith in the home. Our jurisprudence has
consistently affirmed the privileged position accorded a person’s actions in their home, be it
regarding reproductive liberty, sexual intimacy, freedom from unwarranted searches, or merely a
general expectation of privacy. Explaining this fundamental importance of the domestic, the
Court, in Boyd v. United States, held that:
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The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security.. .they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that
constitutes the essence of the offence, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited.77
Therefore, the relationship between personal security and the sanctity of the home is
firmly rooted in this Court’s precedent and tradition. Indeed, it stretches back even farther than
that, finding its inception in the common law. Again, James Wilson explains, “every man’s
house is deemed, by the law, to be his castle, and the law, while it invests him with the power,
enjoins him the duty, of the commanding officer. ‘Every man’s house is his castle,’ says my
Lord Coke in one of his reports, ‘and he ought to keep and defend it at his peril’... For this
reason, one may assemble people together in order to protect and defend his house.”78 This
British common law heritage confirms the central location of the natural right of self
preservation as in the home, in defense of one’s hearth, family, and self.
Hence, while the individual’s interest is at its apex in the home, the State’s corresponding
interest is substantially weaker. As Justice explains in his dissent in McDonald v. Chicago, “The
State generally has a lesser basis for regulating private compared to public acts, and firearms
kept inside the home generally pose a lesser threat to public welfare as compared to firearms
taken outside.”79 This is not to say that the State has no interest in passing certain safety
regulations whose reach extends to the home; it simply suggests that those policies must be
narrower in scope than they otherwise would be in public. The converse is also true: as
individuals are farther removed from their private sphere in the home, the State’s interest in
enacting reasonable regulation to safeguard the public welfare increases significantly.
C
However, our current jurisprudence has yet to articulate a clear standard of review to
determine the constitutionality of any gun regulation. Despite statements in Heller and
McDonald as to certain regulations’ constitutionality, both opinions have not sought to delineate
any sort of bright-line to differentiate acceptable legislation from the unacceptable. As a result,
judges sitting on lower courts have been sent on a kind of “mission impossible,” required to
divine the constitutionality of rules from blanket statements as to the types of regulations this
Court believes to be sensible. Justice Stevens explains that those decisions, “invite an avalanche
of litigation that could mire the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state
and local regulations comport with the Heller ... under a standard of review we have not even
established.”80
Strict scrutiny seems ill-suited to address Second Amendment inquiries as the
Government’s interest in protecting the lives of its citizens will always prove compelling.
Indeed, as Justice Breyer rightly points out, the approval of a broad set of regulations - waiting
periods, licensing requirements, prohibitions of possession of firearms by the metally ill implicitly rejects the applicability of strict scrutiny, as such policies are not narrowly
tailored.”81 Indeed, any attempt to apply strict scrutiny merely devolves into an interest balancing
inquiry in terms of weighing the individual’s interest in self defense against the government’s
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interest in public safety. Such an approach, however, is inappropriate and constitutes a marked
divergence from tradition. Justice Scalia explains, “We know of no other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest
balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government even the Third Branch of Government - the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
right is really worth insisting upon.”82 Such a method is a a judge-empowering one, likely to
yield, not constitutional interpretation, but the enactment of preferred policy positions.
The test we adopt, therefore, in assessing the challenged Miami ordinance is an undue
burden analysis holding that given state regulations: (1) may not unduly burden the fundamental
right, that is, severely, capriciously or arbitrarily, restrict the core of a given right; and (2) must r
reasonably relate to a legitimate government interest. Justice O’Connor explains in Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. that, “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly
burden’ the fundamental right, then our evaluation is limited to our determination that the
regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” Such a test strikes an effective
balance between protecting the heart of a given right on the one hand, and the legitimate interests
associated with State legislation on the other. Nowhere is such a test more appropriate than in the
area of gun regulation.
As we have said, the disputed ordinance completely bans the possession of any firearm in
the home. The City, seeking to reduce gun violence and prevent accidental injury, asks us to
confirm that a policy as this is reasonably related to the legitimate government interest of
protecting the safety of the citizenry. This we cannot do. Few regulations in the 200 history of
this country approach the extremity of the one we consider today. Far from imposing reasonable
or due restrictions on the right in question, the City’s ban on firearms wholly precludes any
exercise of the right itself. To uphold the constitutionality of a uniform ban on the personal
possession of any firearm for any purpose whatsoever is to effectively deny the constitutionality
of the Second Amendment and, in so doing, read that guarantee out of the Constitution. And
given that the inherent right of self defense has been revealed as the central guarantee of the
Second Amendment, we cannot accept an absolute ban on the possession of firearms, especially
given the availability of less-intrusive but nearly equally effective policy alternatives.
Such a position does not deny the fact that the right to keep and bear arms, like all other
rights, is not unlimited. As with speech, religion, and assembly, reasonable time, manner, and
place restrictions may be levied on our arms-bearing right. Put another way, “the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever for whatever
purpose.”84 In fact, the historical record confirms prohibitions on certain classes of weapons in
pursuance of public safety objectives. James Wilson, drawing on Blackstone, explains, “Affrays
are crimes against the personal safety of the citizens; for in their personal safety, their personal
security and peace and undoubtedly comprehended...In some cases, they may be an affray where
there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons,
in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a terrour among the people.”85 As such, the inherent
right to self defense does not comprise a right to defend oneself with any weapon of choice, but
rather, as the Court explained in Miller, those weapons “in common use at the time.”86
As such, we find that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to possess a
handgun, rifle, or shotgun for self defense in the home. Such a list is not arbitrary; rather, it is
informed by those weapons overwhelmingly preferred by Americans as instruments of self
defense. Regarding handguns, Justice Scalia explains, “There are many reasons that a citizen
may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible
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in an emergency; it cannot be easily redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use
for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar
with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”87 Similarly, the shotgun was entirely
devised as a self defense weapon as it is easier to aim than a pistol and delivers more force, thus
making it more likely to stop an intruder. Finally, the rifle, a descendent of the musket while not
necessarily the ideal instrument of self defense in urban settings, may be entirely preferable in
rural communities. And given that the right is exercised primarily in one’s home, as most choose
not to walk the streets toting their rifle, deference ought be given to the individual’s choice of
weapon since the State’s interest is at its lowest. Thus, our analysis makes three critical
distinctions: first, between the purposes of sought arms (ie- self defense versus hunting); second,
between the classes of weapons most suited for those different purposes; and third the location
where the natural right of self preservation is at its height.
Consequently, in furthering the state interest of public safety, be it through decreasing the
number of weapons in circulation or prohibiting especially dangerous weapons, bans on the
private possession of certain classes of arms in the home are entirely warranted. The schema we
propose is a three-tiered one. The first tier, those weapons, places, and purposes least subject to
regulation is described above. As Justice Stevens explains:
The decision to keep a loaded [gun] in the house is often motivated by the
desire to protect life, liberty, and property. It is comparable, in some ways, to
decision about education and upbringing of one’s children... heads of household
must ask themselves whether the desired safety benefits outweigh the risks of
deliberate or accidental misuse that may result in death or serious
injury... Millions of Americans have answered this question in the affirmative, not
infrequently because they believe they have an inalienable right to do so because they consider it an aspect of ‘the supreme human dignity of being master
of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state. 8
The second tier comprises arms desired for hunting, sport, and other non-defense related
objectives. Such weapons, automatics, sniper rifles, and others may kept, but not necessarily in
the home. It would be reasonable to require the storage of such weapons in a gun locker at a
range. The third tier includes military hardware, those weapons which seem peculiar to warfare.
This class of weapons, given the public safety risks of widespread public ownership of weapons
as M-16s, bazookas, mortars, and tanks, are most subject to State regulation and indeed may be
banned outright.
Some, however, may suggest that upholding the constitutionality of bans on military
hardware entirely detaches the prefatory clause from the operative clause, relegating the former
to having no bearing whatsoever on the latter. That is not entirely true. One must necessarily
concede that a person familiar with the maintenance and discharge of a handgun, is likely to be
more well trained in arms than would be his/her non-arms bearing counterpart. Justice Breyer,
citing a Military Officers’ Brief explains, “civilians who are familiar with.. .marksmanship and
safety are more likely to be able to safely and accurately fire a rifle or other firearm with minimal
training upon entering military service.”89 Furthermore, Justice Scalia, citing State v. Kessler
explains that, “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small arms] weapons used by
militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one in the same. However,
these arguments avoid the fundamental point. In colonial times, defense was to be provided by a
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militia composed of the citizenry, who, as in the Revolution, would bring to the battlefield all of
the lawfully and privately owned arms. Over time, our Nation has moved away from this
preference, lodging nearly all responsibility for security in the national standing army. With the
abolishment of conscription, and the establishment of an All-Volunteer Force and National
Guard, the idea of the citizen-soldier has withered, and it very well could be true that a
contemporary militia would require highly elaborate and highly dangerous weaponry. However,
as Justice Scalia puts it, “the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit
between the prefatory and operative clause and the protected right cannot change our
interpretation of the right.”9
We now consider the second challenged portion of the Miami ordinance: that lawfully
owned firearms be stored in a locked container, bound by a trigger-lock, or unloaded and
disassembled. While such a mandate certainly infringes on an individual’s unimpeded right to
self defense in the home, it does not unduly burden that right given the competing state interest
in precluding accidental discharge, especially among adolescents and children. As a City Council
Committee of Washington D.C. recently noted, “for every intruder stopped by a homeowner with
a firearm, there are 4 gun related accidents within the home.”92 History confirms the historical
constitutionality and permissibility of such reasonable storage regulations. A number of colonial
laws from Pennsylvania to New York to Massachusetts required that gunpowder be stored
separately from arms. For example, a law enacted in Boston imposed a fine on “any Person who
shall take into any Dwelling-House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other
Building, within the Town of Boston, any... Fire-Arm, loaded with, or having Gun-Powder.”93
As such, leaving citizens the choice of acquiring a trigger lock, gun safe, or disassembling the
weapon and stowing ammunition separately is reasonably related to the compelling
governmental interest of preventing gun related accidents in the home.
The final piece of the ordinance to be reviewed in the City’s prohibition on concealed
carrying of firearms. Again, as persons move farther beyond the special protection afforded by
one’s home, the State’s interest in regulation increases. As such, the State has a reasonable
interest in requiring that guns be visible be it for enforcement of registration requirements or a
public safety interest. History confirms this point. According to Justice Scalia, “the majority of
19th century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”94 One such law is described by
Justice Breyer. It reads, “Any free person who shall habitually carry about his person, hidden
from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, or weapon of the like kind, from the use
of which the death of any person might probably ensue, shall for every offense be punished by a
fine not exceeding fifty dollars.”95 Thus, regardless of the prudence of the policy, the ordinance’s
restriction on concealed carrying must stand.
Seen in this light, it becomes clear that an affirmation of an inherent right of self defense,
coupled with the judicious application of an undue burden analysis does not, in one fell swoop
call into question time-honored restricts on gun ownership. Registration requirements,
prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons, and laws banning the possession of firearms in
sensitive areas as government buildings, airports, schools, and the like remain good law, law
directed at the very real problems posed by gun violence in the United States.
Ill
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But before squaring the above protection with the disputed regulations we are asked to
review today, we must determine whether the right of self preservation guaranteed by the Second
Amendment is incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment against the States. One theory of
incorporation - total incorporation - was espoused by Justice Black. He maintained that the
entirety of the Bill of Rights was applicable to the States through Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Though never adopted, the Court has consistently moved in that direction,
energetically applying nearly all protections contained in the first eight amendments through a
process known as “selective incorporation.” Aside from guarantees of fair process, the Due
Process Clause seeks to provide special protection against government meddling with certain
fundamental rights and liberties defined by Justice White in Duncan v. Louisiana as those
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institution.”96 Or, as Chief Justice Rehnquist says, “We have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties, which are, objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’... and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that, ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”97
Second, this Court has required that substantive due process cases articulate a precise
description of the asserted liberty or right. Such a standard serves as a check on judicial activism.
As Justice Scalia writes in Reno v. Flores, “‘Substantive due process’ analysis must begin with a
careful description of the asserted right, for ‘the doctrine of judicial self restraint requires us to
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’” 8 Absent
such a requirement, it would be difficult to conceptualize due process rights as anything other
than the Justices’ personal preferences read into the Constitution. Laurence Tribe, though
speaking of the Ninth Amendment, illustrates the general point effectively. He writes, “the Ninth
Amendment,” and indeed we would submit the Fourteenth, “might plausibly come to be seen as
the well from which courts could draw.. .rights of all sorts.. .I would find it hard to convince
myself that they were truly being drawn from the well rather than being poured into it.”99 As
such, the specific contours of the right ought be clearly identified and rooted in the AngloAmerican scheme of liberty.
Balanced against these rights is a longstanding tradition of respect for broad exercise of
States’ police power. Justice Stevens, dissenting in McDonald, explains the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, “‘did not unstitch the basic federalist pattern woven into our
constitutional fabric’...The Constitution still envisions a system of divided sovereignty, still
‘establishes a federal republic where local differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty’
in the vast run of cases, still allows a general ‘police power.. .to the States and the States
alone.’”100 Generally included under police power is regulation of a population’s health, safety,
welfare, and morals. A particular articulation of this police power is described by Justice Breyer
to include, “the power to ‘protect.. .the lives limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
the protection of all property within the State,’ by enacting ‘all kinds ot restraints and burdens on
both persons and property.’”101 Identified as important areas of state concern, the Constitution
has long afforded States special deference in enacting legislation in these areas.
The reason for such a privileging of state power is found in the general preference for
democratic solutions to empirical problems. Indeed in a system of representative democracy, the
majority is empowered to enact desired legislation so long as it passes constitutional muster. The
ultimate desirability of that legislation is decided by the people who have the power to hold their
•elected representatives, unlike unelected judges, accountable for those decisions. Furthermore,
legislators are simply better equipped to amass the data and empirical evidence or proposed
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policy prescriptions and draw accurate conclusions from them. Courts, by contrast, “cannot
easily make empirically based predictions; they have no way to gather and evaluate the data
required to see if such predictions are accurate... nor can judges rely upon local community
views and values when reaching judgments in circumstances where prediction is difficult
because the basic facts are unclear or unknown.” 102
Thus, State flexibility and adaptability may be desirable. The above disadvantage of
judicial solutions to empirical problems suggests that State legislatures are the best stewards of
policy regarding local preferences and conditions, both key virtues of federalism. The pitfalls,
then, of imposing top-down judicial solutions upon state and local officials precludes States from
acting as “laboratories of experimentation” whose process of trial-and-error often benefits the
entire American community. Concerning nonprocedural rules of the Bill of Rights, however,
some suggest that “it is not clear that greater liberty results from the jot-for-jot application of a
provision of the Bill of Rights to the States,” because, “precedents require perfect state/federal
congruence only on matters, ‘at the core’ of the relevant constitutional guarantee.”103 Thus, the
States are left with more legislative tools at their disposal to address concerns lying at the heart
of their police powers.
Yet the rationale for explicitly codifying a Bill of Rights was to enshrine forever those
rights which are beyond the reach of the sovereign, be they King or Congress. The Federal
Farmer explains, “People, ad very wisely too, like to be express and explicit about their essential
rights, and not to be forced to claim them on the precarious and unascertained tenure of
inferences and general principles, knowing that in any controversy between them and their
rulers, concerning those rights, disputes may be endless, and nothing certain.”104 Accordingly,
this Court has eschewed doctrines applying only a diluted version of an incorporated right to the
States. Justice Brennan in Malloy v. Hogan explains, “The Court.. .has rejected the notion that
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the
individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”105 Truly it would bizarre to have protean rights,
morphing according to the actor attempting to infringe it. Applying divergent standards of review
depending on whether a claim was made in federal or state court would be wholly inconsistent.
Consequently rights guarantees “are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those federal rights against federal
encroachment.”106 So too here - the undue burden analysis proscribed above is the minimum
threshold of protection to be applied to the Second Amendment’s protection of the natural law of
self preservation.
As previously explained, it cannot be denied that the State has a legitimate interest in the
regulation of guns. Similarly, proposed incorporation of the Second Amendment involves
substantially different protections than do standards of review for other rights - the protection of
insular minorities through identification of suspect classifications, protecting participation in the
democratic process, and protection of individuals who may suffer unequal treatment at the hands
of the majority. Yet, to suggest that the fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment
is any less essential to liberty is equally wrongheaded.
The historical and textual analysis undertaken above conclusively establishes self-defense
as the central guarantee of the Second Amendment. The history of the English common law,
demonstrated most visibly in the English Bill of Rights as well as the commentaries of both Sir
Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone, confirms the right to keep and bear arms in defense of
oneself, one’s family, and one’s home. This legacy is unmistakably a part of the jurisprudential
DNA of the American colonists who invoked their right to bear arms in reaction to George Ill’s
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attempts to disarm them. This profound fear of general disarmament is enshrined in the advocacy
of the Antifederalists who argue, “we should have fine times indeed, if to punish tyrants, it were
only sufficient to assemble the people. Your arms wherewith you could defend yourselves, are
gone ... Will your Mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment? ... Of what service would
militia be to you, when most probably you will not have a single musket in the State.”107 It was
in response to these fears and in a desire to affirm a number of critically important English
common law rights that the Bill of Rights was demanded. The Federal Farmer writes, “we
discern certain rights ... which the people of England and America of course believe to be
sacred, and essential to their political happiness.”108 Such an individual conception of the right is
supported by the implicit congruence between state analogues ratified in that very same time
period and the federal guarantee.
Perhaps the best evidence of 18th century Americans’ belief that the Second Amendment
right is fundamental to the Anglo-American scheme of liberty and justice is found in the
advocacy of St. George Tucker. Commenting of the Second Amendment, he writes:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. ... The right of
self defense is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of
rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing
armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any
color or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on
the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally,
under the specious pretext of preserving game: a never failing lure to bring over
the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated
for very different purposes (italics added).109
No clearer affirmation of the centrality of that right to our scheme of limited and ordered
government could be articulated. Moreover, this is not an understanding that faded with time.
There is substantial evidence indicating the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate the Second Amendment against the States. Justice Alito provides the
words of Representative Stevens concerning the disarmament of freedmen in 1868. He says,
“Disarm a community and you rob them of the means of defending life. Take away their
weapons of defense and you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty.” 10
In sum, we are aware of the very serious problem of gun violence in the City of Miami as
well as the country in general, and sympathize with the concerns claiming that only a ban on
firearms can ultimately prevent their dissemination and use. The City of Miami has, at its
disposal, a menu of legislative options for combating gun violence; many are described above.
However, a blanket prohibition on the possession of any firearms is not among them. While the
arguments advanced in favor of a blanket ban may well be true, the Constitution cannot condone
such a sweeping policy which turns the fundamental guarantee of the Second Amendment into
idle prattle. While the utility of the Second Amendment in a modem area marked by standing
armies and police forces may be questionable, what cannot be questioned is that it is not the
province of the Supreme Court to place the right on the endangered species list. The right to keep
and bear arms has, at its center, a protection of the inherent right of sell defense, a right at the
very center of our scheme of government which seeks to advance life, liberty, and property.
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